If the UK ever has a referendum on electoral reform, the cube rule is unlikely to be on many posters or car bumpers. Quite apart from being too arcane for any politician to be able to mention it without journalistic ridicule, its main victim these last hundred years has been the runner-up in each general election. And the two main parties of the day have been happy enough with a system which has merely thrust them into a smaller minority when they have been in a minority anyway, in exchange for untrammelled power when they top the poll, even when getting considerably less than half the vote. Meanwhile, the real victims of the first-pastthe-post system, the Liberals and most of the minor parties, would have given a lot to have been on the wrong end of nothing worse than the cube rule.
It was, however, in the context of electoral reform that the cube rule emerged. The idea that, when the ratio of votes gained by the two main parties was a:b, they could expect the ratio of seats to be roughly Conservative to safest Labour, and a cursor moving over them as national voting intentions changed. The number of constituencies falling to the other side with successive 1% swings in one direction would have a frequency distribution that was normal. However Kendall and Stuart gave no reason why the set of constituencies should have a standard deviation that gave a virtual cube -as opposed to square, quartic or anything else -rule.
Gudgin and Taylor 2 add an extra dimension. They use a Markov system in which your probability of voting for X is a function of whether your neighbour votes for X. The "cubeness" of the system will depend on (a) this probability (b) the size of the constituencies. After a detailed look at a constituency in Newcastle, Gudgin and Taylor conclude that this seat possesses the characteristics which, if replicated nationally, would yield something close to a cube rule. Like Kendall and Stuart, however, their concern is not to suggest reasons why a typical seat should be like this.
But in the 1970s and 80s Taagepera tackled the question from a new angle and did came up with a "first principles" explanation, albeit a highly tentative one, for the cube rule. In section 1 we outline this explanation, which relies on the electoral map being fractal, and suggest that Taagepera's premises in fact lead to a "square root of three rule" rather than a cube rule. Section 2 pitches this proposition at the evidence, and section 3 interprets the results: so far as winners do better than they would under a 'square root of three' rule, this suggests that electoral geography is nonfractal, with political heterogeneity increasing as you move from a macro to a micro scale. We also ask how far the geographical pattern of income distribution might explain this.
Theory
Taagepera and Shugart's Seats and Votes (1989) 3 contains a proof of the cube rule in 3 stages:
(1) If, for all pairs of parties, the ratio of seats won is to be a consistent function of ratio of votes won, the ratio of seats must equal the ratio of votes to the power of n.
(2) Under a first-past-the-post system, with single-member constituencies, the coefficient n will be equal to ln(V)/ln(S) where V and S are the total numbers of votes and seats nationally.
(3) ln(V)/ln(S) will be very close to 3.
Let us take these stages one by one.
(1) Here Taagepera draws on a proof by Theil (1969) 4 . Theil shows that for the ratio of seats between all pairs of parties in a multi-party election to bear a consistent relationship with the ratio of their respective votes, it must take the form expressed
= for all i, j, where S is a party's share of the seats and
This relation will hold when and only when ( )
(2) The logarithmic proposition is Taagepera's own. Clearly, Taagepera has to make a specific assumption as to how 'clustered' party support is on the electoral map in order to reach any such conclusion. But what about the variance of the voters in a given town (call this var(L 3 ))? Does it make sense to think of individual voters as 40% or 80% Labour? The answer is that we don't need to: all the fractal principle requires is that there be as many (and using B for the corresponding Conservative shares), then
and
, and not, as Taagepera claims, lnV/lnS.
(3) We now proceed to the final part of Taagepera's justification of the cube rule, his proposition that, under certain reasonable assumptions, constituencies will be chosen of a size that will make lnV/lnS approximately 3.
Assume the system is (consciously or otherwise) designed to minimise the workload of an MP. Assume this is done by minimising the number of channels through which an MP has to communicate (i.e. each potential channel is equally time-consuming). Suppose there are V voters and S MP's. Then each MP has V/S constituents & thus 2V/S channels (one channel each way with each constituent).
But the MP also has a channel to every other MP, and furthermore must monitor all channels between other MP's. This gives him S(S-1) 2 /2 more channels ≅ S 2 /2.
The objective, then is to choose S to minimise C = S 2 /2 + 2V/S. Differentiating gives dC/DS = S -2V/S 2 which is zero at 2V = S 3 i.e. lnV/lnS = approx. 3.
This third proposition is hardly overwhelmingly persuasive, and Taagepera is fairly tentative at advancing it himself as a theory. However, as he rightly points out, it fits a number of countries remarkably accurately in practice (more on this below.)
If, then, we accept it, and substitute the correct rule for n ( S V ln ln ) for Taagepera's incorrect lnV/lnS, we have, not a cube rule, but a 'square root of 3 rule.' If the electoral map really is fractal, and we accept the final part of Taagepera's proof, a ratio a:b of votes will be amplified into a ratio We now look at some empirical evidence. As we have said, if the political adherence map is fractal, we would get the result n = S V ln ln . In the tables below, we use actual values of V and S, i.e. the actual numbers of voters and MPs in each country. Because most of the countries we examine are close to the 2V = S 3 formula, a fractal electoral geography would imply something close to the 3 rule; or, to put it the other way round, the empirical existence of a 3 rule or something close to it would imply a near-fractal electoral geography.
Evidence
We first present actual data in terms of votes cast and available seats for 6 countries where non-PR constituency systems have prevailed and the political system has been dominated by two major parties. The countries are Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, the UK and the US. Using these data we impute a value for n that would hold given fractality. We then go on to estimate actual values of n and compare the estimates with the imputed values. The data constitutes votes attained and seats won by the major parties of these countries in elections since 1955 and was obtained from Keesing's Contemporary Archives.
The data presented in table 1 refers to data for recent elections in each country. The imputed value of n is S V ln ln , the value n would take, given the actual ratio of seats to votes, if the political allegiance map were fractal. Fractality plus Taagepera's model of paranoid MPs predicts a value of n close to √3 (1.732), and the ratio of seats to votes is close in all 6 cases 10 to Taagepera's prediction. We now focus on the issue of fractality itself.
Our econometric test of Taagepera's model is as follows. If
We estimate
where α is an estimable measure of bias, and β is an estimable exponential coefficient. In the above model α = 0 and β = n. Equation (1) requires nothing more than step one of Taagepera's argument and does not require fractality.
Inference concerning fractality follows from our estimates of β. translates as structural breaks (and found to be statistically significant in Australia and the UK). These two factors hamper the econometrics although in most cases a reasonable degree of explanatory power as measured by the adjusted R 2 was found.
In the case of Australia we found that the ALP was severely disadvantaged by the electoral system prior to 1983. In particular, the constant term implies that an ALP vote was 85.4% as powerful as an ALNP vote at that time. Bias in favour of one party or another was also found in Canada (the Conservatives), France (the Socialists) and the UK post 1979 (the Labour Party). These advantages are manifested from regionalism (as in the UK and France, where the favoured party's support has been less uniformly spread across the regions than its rival's) or strength in smaller rural constituencies (as in Australia and Canada).
We found in general that the 'cube rule' could more accurately be described as a 'somewhere between a square and a cube rule' in all cases expect the US. The econometric output of the US yielded much lower levels of significance, and neither parameter was found to be significantly different from zero. Examination of the US data confirms the erratic relationship between votes cast and electoral college votes gained.
Interpretation
With the exceptions of the US and Australia (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) all the cases in table 2 have a statistically significantly higher value of n than a fractal electoral map would
give (the values for n reported in table 1). In other words, in each case σ V /σ S (and hence actual n) exceeds S V ln ln . This implies that, as you take successively smaller bits of the electoral map and blow them up to the size of the whole thing, the degree of clustering diminishes. Voters within a constituency are more diffuse in their political orientations than are constituencies within the nation.
The statistic k, in the final column, is a measure of this effect. k in each case is imputed from n. It represents the departure from fractality necessary to give n its actual value in the country concerned. So how are we quantifying departures from fractality? Suppose, again, that a country were divided into 100 constituencies, each of which were divided into 100 towns. k is then defined as the ratio of constituencies' standard deviation nation-wide to towns' standard deviation within a constituency; or, more generally, the ratio of the respective standard deviations within two pieces of the electoral map that differ by a scale of 100 22 . k=1 is the fractal case. k<1, which is our result in all the countries we have looked at, implies that the more you use the magnifying glass, the more heterogeneous the picture you see. The relationship between n and k is an inverse one 23 , and as k tends to infinity n tends towards unity (proportional representation). This is simply a restatement of the proposition (see above, p. 6) that zero dispersion of voter behaviour in each constituency (σ V =0) is equivalent to each constituency containing only one voter, which obviously implies PR.
In the case of the UK, n fell from 2.46 to 2.088 (and k rose from 0.76 to 0.84) between the two sub-periods. As long ago as Mr Heath's win in 1970, commentators were pointing out that the cube rule seemed to be turning into a square rule. The number of marginal seats was declining, so that a larger swing in the total vote was needed to achieve any given net gain in seats by Labour or the Conservatives (though Norris and Crewe find that the total gross change in seats between all parties did not decline in relation to percentage swing). 24 Later this began to be linked to a regional polarisation of political allegiances. The high point was reached in the general election of 1987, when Labour won only three seats south of a line from the Wash to the Bristol Channel (London excepted) and the Conservatives, despite an 12-point national lead in the vote, only won 10 out of a possible 72 seats north of Hadrian's wall. In 1992 and 1997 there was only a slight reversal of this polarisation -masked, in 1997, by the spectacularly unequal overall result. As the political dispersion of constituencies moves upwards to rival the political dispersion of voters within constituencies, Britain's 'over-fractal' electoral geography appears to be moving closer to 'strict' fractality.
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We have therefore estimated n for different countries and thence inferred how, and how far, their political adherence maps are non-fractal. But what factors actually determine how far away from fractality the political allegiance map is? If we are dealing with two parties whose support is closely related to voters' incomes, then the fractality or otherwise of income distribution is going to be a major determining factor.
We have only looked at income distribution in the UK so far, but we found it to be much more 'super-fractal' even than the distribution of political allegiance, the standard deviation of (log) income in the average constituency being 3.87 times the standard deviation of average constituency incomes around the national mean 26 .
Hence, if people voted entirely according to their income (i.e. all those on £40,000 a year started voting Labour when Labour's lead reached 10% etc.) first-past-thepost would yield, not a cube rule, but something close to a quartic rule.
However, it is no surprise that election results in Britain are much closer to proportionality than this. One of the best-documented electoral facts is the 'chameleon effect' whereby voters partially assume the colouring of the area in which they live. People with £60,000 a year in Jarrow are more prone to vote Labour than people with £60,000 a year in Reigate 27 . We might thus credit our man in Jarrow (Reigate) with a lower (higher) 'effective income' than his actual one. The result will be that Jarrow's (Reigate's) average effective income will be even lower (higher) than its average actual income. To this extent σ S is increased by the chameleon effect, and n is reduced.
But now suppose we have a party whose support is in no way income based -its support courses evenly downwards from millionaires through meths drinkers to university lecturers. There will, nonetheless, be some characteristic, or vector of characteristics, of which the probability of an individual supporting that party will be a monotonic function. The problem is that, unless this vector is identifiable and measurable in individual cases, we will be able to make no predictions as to whether a cube rule, square rule or whatever is likely. We will always be on the firmest ground when weighing up the cube rule for predominantly income-based parties. And in many democracies, the two most unequivocally income-based parties are the two largest parties. This is probably the real reason why the 'n rule' has generally worked best, and has certainly received nearly all the attention, when the context is the two main parties of state.
Conclusion
While we contest Taagepera and Shugart's contention that their assumptions lead to a justification of the cube rule, their 'fractal' yardstick against which to measure the electoral system is an original and very fertile idea. No one would expect the electoral landscape to be neatly fractal or even neatly non-fractal. But the way that the 'attrition-of-minorities' effect is consistently stronger than it would be in a fractal world is significant. So are the facts that the UK, at least, is much closer to fractality than it used to be, and has always been much closer to fractality than if people had voted purely according to their incomes. Overall it seems that political diversity is greater within than between constituencies, but that this gap is narrowed by the 'chameleon effect' whereby your neighbours affect your own vote and, even after this effect is allowed for, shows signs of narrowing still further. ( ) with several votes each (and some with more votes than others). Note that, while unequal electoral districts may well introduce bias into the system, they will not affect the value of n. To see this imagine that a uniform swing of x% across electoral districts causes y% of seats to change hands. Now imagine that one of the districts loses all but 10 of its voters, but that its proportionate political composition is the same as before. A uniform x% swing will still cause y% of seats to change hands.
14 Standard Errors are in parentheses.
16 first-preference votes.
17 first-preference votes.
18 The 1993 observation was found to be an extreme outlier and was omitted from the sample.
19 The 1986 election in which the French 'experimented' with Proportional
Representation was omitted.
20 In the 1996 election New Zealand switched to a MMP electoral system and so we exclude this observation.
21 UNR and Independents (until 1967) , UDR and Independent Republicans (1968 & 1973) , RPR and UDF (1978 onwards.) Since none of these pairs has literally been a coalition, but rather two distinct parties, which have fought against one another in general elections, we might expect them to get fewer seats per vote than a single right-wing party would. However, our figures refer to the second ballot in each French election, in which the two candidates with the most votes run off against each other. It has been rare for these two to be the two main parties of the right, and rarer still for one not to stand down in favour of the other. To all intents and purposes, therefore, their combined second-ballot electoral performance has been equivalent to that of a single party, and they can be treated as such for the present purpose. 26 Calculated from figures in HMSO, New Earnings Survey 1997 (London : HMSO, 1998 ).
